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REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts set forth in the Brief of Cache Valley Bank is not 
contested. However, Bud Bailey's Brief mischaracterizes the previous proceedings 
including the trial court's evidentiary findings, the primary legal issues involved and 
the trial court rulings that were later reversed. The issue remanded for consideration 
after the first appeal was a new issue; what penalty or damage, if any, would be "just" 
to impose for the Bank's temporary failure to answer the interrogatory as to offset 
claims. The Bank admitted a failure to do so, but contended this was principally 
caused by the improper service and in any event that the damages from such a failure 
were very limited. The trial court received briefs and arguments as to this new issue. 
In response, Bud Bailey did not introduce any evidence regarding prejudice or 
damages it suffered as a result of the Bank's error. 
Bud Bailey's Brief ignores facts which have remained uncontested throughout 
this matter. The facts requiring clarification and/or renewed emphasis are as follows. 
1. In the trial court's ruling at the April 2, 2007 hearing, the same from 
which the first appeal was taken, the trial court stated ".. .the biggest issue I have with 
the bank [is that after] the date of the garnishment, 27 checks were [subsequently] 
allowed to be cleared through the bank account." (First Addendum, p. 2 lines 8-11). 
2. In the April 2, 2007 hearing, the trial court said the following with respect 
to the Bank taking the funds in the judgment creditor's deposit account as an offset 
against a loan owed to the Bank "I don't have any problem with doing that, as I read 
the documents but I don't understand how they can allow themselves in this defacto 
receivership to go against a court order and say these other people [subsequently] 
have a right to the money instead of [Bud Bailey]" (First Addendum, p. 3 lines 3-7). 
3. The trial court's inquiries, statements and ruling of April 2, 2007 were 
devoted to whether the Bank had properly offset the funds when it allowed checks to 
pass through the judgment debtor's account [subsequently] to pay third parties after 
the Writ of Garnishment had been returned, (see generally First Addendum, also at p. 
4 line 6; p. 4 line 20; p.6 line 11; p. 7 lines 5-19; p. 9 lines 12-15; and p. 20 lines 7-8). 
4. The principal position of the trial court in its April 2, 2007 ruling was that 
the Bank's offset rights were limited to those funds that it took from the deposit 
account and applied to judgment debtor's loans. The trial court held that allowing 
third parties to receive payments [subsequently] from the deposit account was not 
offsetting, but was rather ".. .circumventing] a valid judgment and a valid 
garnishment, and therefore, what [the Bank] did violated and was in contempt of the 
order of the Court." (First Addendum, p. 23-24). 
5. The trial court remarked that it had given the Bank three hearings to 
present evidence to show it what it had done, namely allowing third parties to be paid 
[subsequent] of the garnishment, complied with the law.(First Addendum, p. 20 lines 
7-12). 
6. In its current Brief, Bud Bailey makes reference to the April 2, 2007 
hearing and states that "Cache Valley again failed to submit any evidence to support 
is arguments ..." (p. xiii of Bud Baileys Brief). 
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7. During the first appeal, Bud Bailey's Brief argued, inter alia, that (1) the 
Bank had failed to meet the requirements for maintaining a right to offset; (2) the 
Bank failed to properly exercise its right to offset; (3) that Bud Bailey's security 
interest had priority over the third parties that received [subsequent] payments from 
the judgment debtor's account; (4) that the balance of the Bud Bailey's judgment was 
assessed against the Bank for its contempt of the garnishment OK In and not on the 
basis of the garnishment being continuing in nature; and (5) that the Bank waived any 
defense it had regarding the service of the Writ of Garnishment. {See p. 3, 5, 8, 10 and 
11 of Bud Bailey's first appeal brief). 
8. The first appeal was devoted primarily to issues oi priority, offset rights 
and penalties for contempt. 
9. The subject upon which this matter was remanded, namely the amount, if 
any, that should be assessed against the Bank for its failure to jclequately respond to 
the initial garnishment interrogatory, was not considered by the trial court or Bud 
Bailey in the first appeal and referenced only in passing. These references are 
identified below: 
a. In its May 9, 2007 OK|I I the trial coin t makes reference to the failure to 
claim an offset, but these references were not used as the basis for the 
trial court's ruling. (R. 235-236). Instead the trial court's Order justifies 
its finding of contempt and award to Bud Bailey on the grounds that 
checks were allowed to be paid to "third parties." (R. 236-237). 
Bud Bailey also argued m its Brief on the first appeal that the Bank failed to marshal evidence and that it was 
entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. 
b. With respect to the notice of offset in the interrogatory, the trial court 
acknowledged that such notice was made when the Bank's legal counsel 
first appeared, but held that the notice was not timely under the 
garnishment statute. (First Addendum, p. 23 lines 2-5) 
c. The subject of the Bank's failure to initially indicate an offset in its 
answer to the interrogatories was referenced only once in Bud Bailey's 
argument in its Brief on the first appeal.2 (p. 6 -7 of Bud Bailey's first 
appeal brief). 
10. The assertions in Bud Bailey's Brief that the Bank has repeatedly failed 
"to submit any evidence to support its arguments" clearly relates to topics that were 
resolved during the first appeal rather than the new issue on remand, (p. xi and xii of 
Bud Bailey's Brief). 
11. The record clearly demonstrates that prior to the remand, this case was a 
controversy over the nature and scope of the Writ of Garnishment and not the amount 
the Bank should pay for its failure to adequately respond to the garnishment 
interrogatory. 
12. Bud Bailey has not provided evidence of or even alleged any actual 
damages or prejudice as a result of the Bank initially leaving blank the interrogatory 
regarding offsets. 
2
 Bud Bailey's reference to the unanswered interrogatory was not claimed as a basis for an assessment against 
the Bank under Rule 64D; instead Bud Bailey stood on the trial court's conclusion that the Bank's action in 
letting checks be paid to third parties did not demonstrate an offset. 
13. Throughout the course of this matter, the trial court has not considered, 
analyzed or attributed any actual damages or prejudice incurred by Bud Bailey in 
determining the just amount the Bank should pay for its failure to adequately respond 
to the interrogatory. 
14. The Bank acknowledges that it waived the opportunity to quash service of 
the improperly served Writ of Garnishment by appearing and defending in this matter. 
However, the Bank makes no concession on the fact that the Writ of Garnishment was 
improperly served. 
15. The significance of the improper service of the Writ became recognized 
only after this case was remanded; because up until that time the case involved 
erroneous legal theories and arguments concerning the priority and nature of the Writ 
of Garnishment as well as penalties for contempt. 
16. Notwithstanding, the waiver of the defense of improper service; the Bank 
has at all times throughout these proceedings maintained the fact that the Writ of 
Garnishment was improperly served on an administrative assistant working in the 
Bank rather than the registered agent. 
17. Throughout these proceedings Bud Bailey has never asserted that the Writ 
of Garnishment was served on the registered agent of the Bank. 
18. Throughout these proceedings Bud Bailey has never denied that the Writ 
of Garnishment was served on an administrative assistant of the Bank. 
19. This Court, in its prior Opinion, stated that the trial court could consider 
the improper service on remand in determining the amount, if any, the Bank should 
pay for its failure to adequately respond to the garnishment interrogatories. (R. 280). 
20. In its Ruling on Remand Issue, the trial court considered the improper 
service of the Writ, but in so doing made errors of law and fact as to that service. 
a. The trial court ignored the written evidence in the return of service by 
the process server that the Writ was served on an administrative 
assistant and not on the Bank's registered agent. 
b. The trial court finds inexplicably "While [the Bank] argues that service 
of the writ of garnishment on its administrative assistant was improper, 
[the Bank] has not presented any evidence to support its argument." (R. 
331). 
c. The trial court's finding contradicts the record and ignores the 
requirements set forth in Rule 4(d)(1)(E) U.R.C.P. 
d. The trial court fails to note that improper service has never been denied 
or contradicted by Bud Bailey. 
e. The trial court finds improper service under the requirements of Rule 
4(d)(1)(E) U.R.C.P. can be effectively annulled or cured by the 
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior (R. 331). 
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SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
Throughout this matter Bud Bailey has failed to provide any evidence or make 
any claim of actual injury or prejudice as a result of the Bank's temporary error. This 
is a failure to address the issue on remand and a failure to address the central 
argument of the Bank's Brief. Instead, Bud Bailey relies on the pleadings and 
arguments made in the first appeal to support its arguments despite the fact that these 
prior proceedings do not bear any relevance to the issue on remand. 
Bud Bailey's Brief incorrectly asserts that the Bank has failed to provide 
evidence to support its arguments. On the first appeal, the parties' arguments and trial 
court's ruling were devoted to the nature and scope of the Writ of Garnishment and 
penalties for contempt. The topic of the Bank's failure to initially indicate an offset in 
the garnishment interrogatory was scarcely mentioned in the trial court's April 2, 
2007 ruling, accompanying Order, Bud Bailey's pleadings or its Brief in the first 
appeal. Consequently, the notion that the Bank has failed to provide evidence to 
support its arguments can only refer to the subject matter upon which the Bank 
prevailed during the first appeal and to which the trial court erred. 
The issue remanded to the trial court was the issue it should have limited itself 
to in its first ruling; namely a determination of a just amount, if any, that the Bank 
should pay for its failure to adequately respond initially to the garnishment 
interrogatory. On remand, the Bank again presented the undisputed fact that the Writ 
of Garnishment had been improperly served on an administrative assistant and argued 
that this was the cause of its failure to indicate an offset in the interrogatory. The 
Bank also presented the uncontested fact that the error in the interrogatory was 
corrected at its first appearance before the trial court. It remains undisputed that Bud 
Bailey learned of the error and the same was corrected at or before the first hearing. 
Aside from the facts presented by the Bank, the only other evidence that would 
bear on the remand issue is whether the Bank acted willfully in leaving the 
interrogatory blank. Assuming fault was found, the trial court would then need to 
determine the extent of the damages sustained by Bud Bailey as a result of the Bank's 
error. On these subjects, Bud Bailey has yet to produce evidence or make any 
argument that it was injured or prejudiced by the Bank's error. Moreover, there has 
never been any claim that the Bank's omission was willful. Similarly, the trial court's 
Ruling on Remand is completely lacking of any such consideration or analysis. 
Bud Bailey's Brief and the trial court's Ruling on Remand contort the prior 
course of these proceedings in order to justify an untenable result on the remand issue. 
These arguments contradict the record of what matters were put at issue in the first 
appeal and are not appropriately applied to the issue on remand. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. BUD BAILEY HAS NOT ADDRESSED THE ISSUE ON REMAND OR 
THE CENTRAL ARGUMENTS OF CACHE VALLEY BANK 
This Court remanded this case for a determination of the just amount to be 
assessed, if any, against the Bank solely for its failure to adequately respond initially 
to the garnishment interrogatory. (R. 283). Central to the issue of determining what 
amount is just, if any, is the harm incurred by Bud Bailey as a result of the error. An 
additional inquiry might be whether the Bank's error was willful. 
The Bank's arguments on remand and in its Brief were largely devoted to 
assessing the potential magnitude of harm to Bud Bailey and whether there was any 
evidence of contempt in the Bank's incomplete answer to the interrogatory. The Brief 
filed by Bud Bailey completely ignores these arguments. Throughout this matter Bud 
Bailey has failed to produce evidence or assert any prejudice or injury as a result of 
the Bank's error. 
Bud Bailey was not materially prejudiced by the Bank's incomplete answer to 
the interrogatory. Bud Bailey's claim to the judgment debtor's account was legally 
junior to the Bank's. Consequently, there was no impairment to Bud Bailey's 
Judgment or ability to collect because it was legally entitled to nothing. Without an 
effective and legal claim to the funds, the only detriment incurred by Bud Bailey 
would have been the legal fees, court costs and/or any incidental expenses incurred 
until it was informed of the Bank's legal offset rights. 
The Bank's omission in leaving the interrogatory on offset blank was not 
willful or contemptuous. The exclusive cause of the error was the service of the Writ 
of Garnishment on an administrative assistant of the Bank. Bud Bailey has never 
asserted that unanswered interrogatory was intentional or even negligent. The only 
assertion Bud Bailey has made regarding the interrogatory was that it was left blank;3 
(p. x of Bud Bailey's Brief). 
and this alone is provided as justification for the conclusion that the Bank should be 
assessed $175901.94. 
As to actual prejudice or injury, Bud Bailey has completely failed to provide 
evidence or to assert any claims. There is no quantification of costs or expenses. 
Moreover, Bud Bailey has not alleged that the unanswered interrogatory was the 
result of willful or contemptuous conduct. As the Appellate Court suggested, the 
determination should be based upon what is just; meaning that it must bear some 
relationship to the error made and any harm suffered. The legal theories and 
justifications that were used to reach the erroneous ruling on the first appeal are 
insufficient to address the remand issue. 
Bud Bailey's arguments on the remand issue are conclusory and without 
foundation. The Brief submitted by Bud Bailey provides no relevant or monetary 
justification for the amount to be assessed and is completely unresponsive to the 
central arguments raised by the Bank. The trial court's finding of what is "just" is 
entirely based upon the precise amount that happens to be in the account at the time 
the garnishment was served. Were there $20,000 more or less, one is left to assume 
what is "just" would simply increase or decrease accordingly to the account balance. 
That is not what the Court of Appeals asked the trial court to determine. 
II. CACHE VALLEY BANK'S ONLY ERROR WAS IN FAILING TO 
RESPOND TO THE INTERROGATORY AS TO CLAIMS FOR 
OFFSETS. 
Throughout these proceedings, the Bank has never contested that it failed to 
adequately respond initially to the garnishment interrogatory. The Bank had a 
security interest in the judgment debtor's deposit account and a right to offset; this 
fact was not noted in its response to the garnishment interrogatory. The portion of the 
garnishment interrogatory asking whether the garnishee claimed an offset was left 
blank. (R. 102). This was an error. 
Due to this incomplete response, Bud Bailey was caused to believe for a short 
time period that the $17,901.94 existing in the judgment debtor's account would be 
garnished and remitted within 20 days of the Bank's response. The Bank corrected 
this misunderstanding at its first appearance in this matter by informing Bud Bailey 
and the trial court that it had a security interest in the deposit account and that it 
claimed an offset therefrom. (R. 133-134). 
The entirety of the Bank's offense in this case was its failure to indicate an 
offset in the garnishment interrogatory. This error was corrected by the Bank at the 
first opportunity afforded to it. (R. 133-134). What has transpired since that simple 
mistake is an array of erroneous theories and unsupported conclusions proffered by 
Bud Bailey and accepted by the trial court concerning the Bank's offset rights, 
priority to the funds and penalties for contempt leading to a judgment for all funds 
that subsequently passed through the account. 
The issue on remand only relates to the error in the initial response; it has no 
connection to the claims that were reversed in the first appeal. The remand issue was 
not properly considered by the trial court after the remand. 
III. CACHE VALLEY BANK'S ARGUMENTS ARE SUPPORTED BY 
UNDISPUTED FACTS. 
At Point I of its Brief, Bud Bailey argues that the Bank has failed to provide 
any evidence to support its arguments during the course of this matter. The 
suggestion that the Bank has repeatedly failed to provide evidence to support its 
arguments misrepresents the record as to the arguments involved with the first appeal 
and the outcome of that appeal. 
During the multiple evidentiary hearings that preceded the first appeal, the trial 
court and Bud Bailey found fault with the Bank's actions in subsequently allowing 
"third parties'5 to be paid after the return of the Bud Bailey garnishment. (See R.181-
202 and First Addendum). Bud Bailey's arguments during the first appeal continued 
this line of reasoning as a basis for supporting the trial court's decision, (p. 2-11 of 
Bud Bailey's first appeal brief). 
All of the issues concerning the priority of the Bank's security interest in the 
deposit account, nature of the Writ, the offsetting of funds and subsequent allowance 
of checks to be paid to third-parties, were resolved in the Bank's favor in the first 
appeal. Naturally, the arguments and evidence provided by the Bank up to and 
including the first appeal were devoted to these issues rather than the single isolated 
issue that was remanded to the trial court. 
The issue that was remanded to the trial court was not considered during the 
first appeal. It is therefore a patent mischaracterization to state that the Bank has 
failed to provide evidence to support its arguments during the course of this matter. 
The sufficiency of the evidence provided by the Bank is demonstrated no more 
unequivocally than by the fact that the trial court's ruling on the first appeal was 
reversed by this Court's December 4, 2008 Opinion. 
The issue that was remanded to the trial court was a very narrow subject; to 
wit, the just amount, if any, the Bank should pay for its failure to adequately respond 
to the garnishment interrogatory. The evidence that would be relevant in considering 
why a response to a single interrogatory was left blank is necessarily limited. 
Nevertheless, the Bank cited the undisputed fact that the Writ was improperly served 
as the reason for the incomplete response. On remand the Bank also argued, inter 
alia, that if the trial court was going to assess an amount against it, that it should 
consider whether the Bank's incomplete response to the interrogatory was intentional 
and whether Bud Bailey suffered any loss as a result of the incomplete response. 
On the issue of improper service, the trial court ignored a material fact which 
had been established by the Bank and never disputed by Bud Bailey, namely that the 
Writ of Garnishment was improperly served on an administrative assistant rather than 
the registered agent. Moreover, instead of measuring the amount to be assessed 
against the Bank in proportion to its conduct or harm to Bud Bailey, the trial court 
used the proceedings prior to the first appeal and the doctrine of respondeat superior 
to justify its awarding the full amount legally possible under the Rules. 
The Bank has provided ample evidence to support its arguments. A single 
interrogatory was not timely answered. The explanation for this failure was provided 
and it was supported by the undisputed fact that the Writ was improperly served. 
Barring an analysis of whether the Bank acted willfully or measuring the loss suffered 
by Bud Bailey, there is no other relevant evidence upon which to consider the remand 
issue. 
IV. BUD BAILEY'S STATEMENTS REGARDING THE SERVICE OE THE 
WRIT ARE FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY INCORRECT. 
In its Brief, Bud Bailey states that the Bank waived the defense of improper 
service of the Writ and that the Bank failed to present any evidence tying the 
unanswered interrogatory to the improper service. Moreover, Bud Bailey applies the 
erroneous doctrine of respondeat superior to obviate the provisions of Rule 4 and to 
transfer the burden of perfecting service from the issuing party to the receiving party. 
A. Improper Service of the Writ 
On the subject of improper service, Bud Bailey conflates waiver of the defense 
of improper service with waiver as to the fact of improper service. The Bank has not, 
nor is it now, attempting to quash service of the Writ. When the Bank first appeared 
in this case it waived such defenses.4 However, the Bank has not waived the fact that 
the service of the Writ was improper. 
At all stages of this case the Bank has asserted that service of the Writ was 
improper and has introduced evidence establishing as much. The issue of improper 
service was raised in the Bank's February 26, 2007, Response to Garnishment and 
Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt; the Bank's first pleading filed in this matter. 
(R. 136). The purpose in presenting this fact throughout the case is not to quash 
service, but to provide justification for the incomplete response to the interrogatory. 
4
 At its first appearance, the Bank did however, correct the error in the unanswered interrogatory by claiming a 
security interest and offset in the judgment debtor's account. (R. 133-134). 
i /: 
In its December 4, 2008 Opinion, this Court indicated that the improper 
services was a fact".. .that the trial court may consider on remand when determining 
what amount the Bank should be required to pay for its failure to respond adequately 
to the interrogatories" (R. 292). The trial court did in fact consider the improper 
service, but in so doing applied incorrect conclusions of law5 and ignored facts which 
had never been disputed. 
The improper service of the Writ is a fact that bears heavily on the remand 
issue. Bud Bailey's argument attempts to dispose of this key fact by conflating it with 
waiver of a legal defense which is not being presented. 
B. Connection between the Unanswered Interrogatory and Improper Service. 
Bud Bailey argues that the Bank has failed to tie its failure to answer the 
garnishment interrogatory with the alleged improper service, (p. 6 of Bud Bailey's 
Brief). The registered agent for the Bank is its legal counsel, the same counsel who 
now appears in this matter and who makes this argument. Service of process on 
Cache Valley Bank is designated to go to the Bank's legal counsel. It is self-evident 
that improperly served interrogatories are likely to lead to improper responses. 
Moreover, this argument by Bud Bailey presupposes that any random administrative 
assistant found in the lobby of a bank can be served and such person should 
understand Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and offset rights. It defies 
common sense to impute to a range of clerical employees knowledge of offset rights 
Respondeat Superior (R. 330). 
and law that even Bud Bailey and the trial court did not demonstrate in the prior 
proceedings. 
The axiomatic purpose of Rule 4(d)(1)(E) is to avoid the very defect in 
response that occurred in this case. It is ridiculous to force the Bank to prove what it 
would have done had service gone to its designated registered agent. Such proof 
would inherently be speculative. That is the very reason why corporations are 
allowed by law to precisely and carefully designate who shall accept legal service. 
The name and address must be published to the world. To ignore this rule is to create 
a state of chaos never envisioned by the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. Rule 4(d)(1)(E) and the Burden of Effectuating Proper Service 
In its Brief, Bud Bailey uses the trial court's application of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior to argue that the Bank should be held vicariously liable for the 
error on the part of the administrative assistant (p. 7 of Bud Bailey's Brief). Bud 
Bailey also argues that the Bank should have in place procedures and safeguards to 
notify its attorneys or managers when Writs of garnishment are improperly served (p. 
8 of Bud Bailey's Brief). 
The application of the respondeat superior doctrine to Rule 4(d)(1)(E), would 
render the Rule of no consequence. Following Bud Bailey's argument; any employee 
can be unilaterally designated the service agent by the process server and the 
employer can be held liable for defects that are occasioned by such service. In the 
present case, the subordinate employee's failure to claim an offset in an improperly 
served interrogatory is supposed grounds for assessing $17,901.94 against the 
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employer. This penalty is further augmented when the legal fees and costs of 
reversing the trial court's erroneous decision on the first appeal are taken into account. 
Similarly, Bud Bailey argues that the Bank should have mechanisms in place 
to filter documents that are improperly served on its employees, (p. 8 of Bud Bailey's 
Brief). This argument attempts to shift the burden of perfecting service from the 
issuing party to the receiving party. Each provision of Rule 4(d) deals with 
affirmative acts that must be performed by the party issuing service. The Rules are 
devoid of any requirement on the part of the recipient to effectuate proper service. 
The Rules regarding service of process on a corporation have no more basic 
function than to avoid the very kind of issue that has arisen in the present case; 
namely that of incomplete response to a set of interrogatories. Bud Bailey's 
arguments that employers are liable for improper service on their employees, and that 
the burden of perfecting service should be shifted to the receiving party, are not 
supported by the Rules, statute, legal authority or reason. 
V. BUD BAILEY'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY ADDRESSED THE ISSUE ON REMAND IS INCORRECT. 
Bud Bailey argues that the trial court's Ruling on Remand was reasoned and 
proper, (p. 6 of Bud Bailey's Brief). For reasons that will be discussed in Section VI 
herein, the reasoning and legal basis for the trial court's ruling are difficult to 
recognize. Nevertheless, the trial court ignored the undisputed fact of the improper 
service and applied respondeat superior to make the Bank vicariously liable for the 
error made by its employee. These, by themselves, are sufficient grounds for a 
finding that the trial court did not properly address the issue on remand. 
The balance of the Ruling on Remand is devoted to recasting the prior 
proceedings in a way that limited the trial court's error to merely exceeding the 
amount that could be assessed against the Bank under Rule 64D. A fair reading of the 
trial court's April 2, 2007 decision, the same from which the first appeal derived, 
plainly demonstrates that trial court's concern and decision were not based on an 
unanswered interrogatory, but rather the Bank's actions in allowing the subsequent 
payment of checks to third parties after the date of garnishment.6 
The trial court held that allowing third parties to subsequently receive 
payments from the deposit account was not offsetting, but was rather 
".. .circumvent[ing] a valid judgment and a valid garnishment, and therefore, what 
they did violated and was in contempt of the order of the Court." (First Addendum, p. 
23-24). 
The trial court has, in effect, used the Ruling on Remand to rehabilitate a prior 
decision that was based on erroneous legal theories. It focused on an entirely 
different issue than that which was remanded to it. This, taken with the errors in law 
and fact on the Ruling on Remand, demonstrate that the trial court did not properly 
address the issue on remand. 
6
 See generally First Addendum, also at p. 2 lines 8-11 and p. 3 lines 3-7. 
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VI. THE FORM OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING DOES NOT 
COMPLY WITH RULE 54(A). 
Bud Bailey argues that there were no disputed facts on the remand issue and 
states that the trial court was not required to make findings of facts. Bud Bailey then 
goes on to claim that the May 9, 2007 Order, the same which was reversed by this 
Court, clearly set forth the issue on remand, (p. 9 of Bud Bailey's Brief). 
No legal authority exists, and none is presented by Bud Bailey, that releases a 
trial court from compliance with Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. The Rule states that "[i]n all 
actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon." (emphasis added). These 
requirements are ".. .essential to the resolution of a dispute under the proper rule of 
law." Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979) (internal citation omitted). 
Bud Bailey provides no argument or legal authority to support its conclusion 
that the trial court was not required to make findings of fact. The May 9, 2007 Order 
referenced by Bud Bailey makes passing reference to the incomplete response to the 
interrogatory, but the Order does not use this fact as a basis for the amount that it 
assessed against the Bank. (R. 235-236). 
Bud Bailey's reliance on the trial court's May 9, 2007 Order reveals its failure 
to understand the prior proceedings as well as the proper issue on remand. This prior 
Order was devoted to reprimanding the Bank for allowing subsequent checks to be 
paid to third parties and denying the Bank's claim that it properly offset the judgment 
debtor's account. To wit, the trial court describes the Bank as having "circumvented] 
a valid judgment and valid garnishment." (R. 236). The trial court then concludes by 
saying that the Bank ".. .violated the Order of this Court and as a result [the Bank] is 
in Contempt..." (R. 237). At this stage of the case, the trial court's May 9, 2007 
Order serves no purpose other than to memorialize its erroneous legal theories and 
improper ruling that was ultimately reversed on the first appeal. The trial court erred 
in using it as a basis for its ruling on remand. 
Neither the Ruling on Remand nor accompanying Order are in compliance 
with Rule 52(a). Additionally, the trial court's May 9, 2007 Order that was reversed 
on the first appeal does not address the issue on remand. As such, the trial court has 
provided no reason for assessing any amount against the Bank; much less the 
maximum amount permitted under Rule 64D. 
VII. THE BILLING STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY BUD BAILEY 
DEMONSTRATE THAT ATTORNEYS' FEES WERE IMPROPERLY 
AWARDED. 
In this Court's December 4, 2008 Opinion, it reversed the trial court's award of 
attorneys' fees and instructed the trial court to award attorneys' fees if it deemed they 
were appropriate. (R. 283). In its Brief, Bud Bailey correctly states that attorneys' 
fees could be awarded to it as a result of the Bank's failure to adequately respond to 
the garnishment interrogatory, (p. 11 of Bud Bailey's Brief). However, Bud Bailey 
incorrectly concludes that such fees should extend beyond the time that the deficiency 
in the garnishment answer was corrected. 
The Bank informed Bud Bailey, no later than February 16, 2007, of its claim to 
an offset in judgment debtor's deposit account. This date, February 16, 2007, is 
explicitly and unequivocally recorded in Bud Bailey's own billing statement that was 
?? 
provided as part of its Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees. The billing statement reads 
"2/16/07 - .. .Review new documents from atty George Daines on Cache Valley 
security interest and right to setoff..." (R. 344). Additionally, the Bank's first 
pleading filed in this matter on February 26, 2007, appropriately asserted the offset 
claim that was omitted from the response to the garnishment interrogatory. (R. 136-
137). 
From February 16, 2007, forward Bud Bailey was duly informed of the 
information that was missing from the interrogatory; to wit, that the Bank had a 
security interest in the funds and it claimed an offset. As of February 16, 2007, Bud 
Bailey proves, by its own records, that the Bank's error was corrected. 
The attorneys' fees and costs that were incurred by Bud Bailey after February 
16, 2007 were in pursuit of actions and legal theories that were unrelated to the 
Bank's failure to adequately respond to the garnishment interrogatory. The claims 
and arguments made by Bud Bailey on the first appeal are preserved in the record and 
clearly show that the Bank's inadequate response to the garnishment was not the 
issue. Accordingly, the award of these additional attorneys' fees to Bud Bailey that 
were incurred during the first appeal, are in contravention to Rule 64D and this 
Court's December 4, 2008 Opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
Bud Bailey's Brief contains no legal or factual basis as to why the full amount 
allowed under Rule 64D should be assessed against the Bank. Bud Bailey has also 
failed to address why the Bank should be required to pay attorneys' fees that were 
incurred after it was informed of the Bank's offset rights in the judgment debtor's 
account. 
The record in this case stands as an objective witness to the claims and 
arguments made by Bud Bailey and reasoning used by the trial court in making its 
decisions. In its Brief, Bud Bailey attempts to recast the prior proceedings in a way 
that would allow the trial court's initial ruling to conform to the issue on remand. 
Bud Bailey's arguments contradict the record and the bases for its statements and 
conclusions are founded on erroneous legal theories and claims that were reversed in 
the first appeal. 
The trial court has assessed the harshest penalty permitted under the Rule 64D 
against the Bank for a minor error that was itself primarily occasioned by Bud 
Bailey's improper service. In so doing, the trial court applied erroneous conclusions 
of law and has ignored relevant and undisputed facts that provide explanation for this 
eiTor. 
The decision reached by the trial court does not comply with the Rule 52(a) 
because the ruling and order are not supported by facts, analysis or reasoning that 
were germane to the remand issue. Finally, the trial court's award of attorneys' fees 
does not comply with the Rule 64D or this Court's prior Opinion. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Bank requests that the Court of Appeals 
reverse the decision of the trial court and award the relief requested in the Bank's 
Brief. 
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RULING 22 
1 I FARMINGTON, UTAH - APRIL 2, 2007 
2 | JUDGE JON M. MEMMOTT 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: We're here to accept argument on the 
5 I Order to Show Cause and Contempt for the Garnishment. I have 
6 received pleadings, I've reviewed and read them. There was 
7 J some supplemental documents received. Both parties want to 
8 present oral argument today? What do you want to do? 
9 MR. NYKAMP: I don't (inaudible), Your Honor, that 
10 I necessarily need to present or oral argument but would be 
11 happen to answer any questions — 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. NYKAMP: - that Your Honor has. I think it was 
14 pretty well explained in my brief. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. JENSON: Your Honor, I'm Todd Jenson 
17 representing Cache Valley Bank (inaudible) present oral 
18 I argument (inaudible) review the bank's position and go 
19 (inaudible). 
20
 THE COURT: Maybe I can, Mr. Jenson, have some very 
21 | specific questions. I understand the positions you're saying 
22 | and everything else. Let me tell you the greatest difficulty 
23 I have with the position of the bank is asserting is that 
24 they paid the first writ obviously which is I think -
25 MR. JENSON: (Inaudible). 
1 THE COURT: But the second one on November 1 they 
2 l said they entered into something called a defacto 
3 
4 
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receivership. Now nowhere under the law of garnishment or 
nowhere in the documents of any document that I have read 
from the bank that I have gone through, do I have this 
defacto receivership and I understand receivership in 
bankruptcy, I understand receiverships but I don't know what 
this defacto receivership is and let me tell you the biggest 
issue I have with the bank. There are, since the date of the 
garnishment, 27 checks were allowed to be cleared through the 
bank account. One credit card payment was allowed to clear 
through the bank and then one auto transfer debit, I assume 
that was a debit card or something like that for $11,000. So 
there was a debit card allowed to clear through the bank. To 
me that would indicate that - and in that amount is 
$42,412.48 from after they received the garnishment, they 
allowed to be cleared and paid to other parties. I mean, 
when the bank checks clear it's not the bank receiving the 
money on their loans or anything else, it's allowing another 
party to receive a debt they have against this party and it 
appears to me that the bank with this defacto receivership is 
deciding as against a court order that these people have the 
right to receive the funds ahead of themselves, the bank, 
because they're not taking the funds for themselves, I 
understood if they said, okay, we want an offset, we're 
1 closing down this account, we're taking the money to offset, 
2 we think there's a danger they're not going to pay and they 
3 exercise that. I don't have any problem with doing that as I 
4 read the documents but I don't understand how they can allow 
5 themselves in this defacto receivership to go against a court 
6 order and say these other people have a right to get the 
7 I money instead of us, the bank, and instead of the garnishee, 
8 I mean the person that garnished. That's what I don't 
9 understand under the law because I can't find that or read 
10 that or allow that in anywhere under the law. So that's an 
11 issue I need to understand. 
12 MR. JENSON: I can go through that. What happened 
13 - and in fact, oh, about a year ago is when the bank's served 
14 | the first garnishment and the bank (inaudible) dropped the 
15 ball on that one (inaudible) garnishment and didn't exercise 
16 the right (inaudible) at that time. 
17 Then in October I believe it was, don't know the 
18 I exact date, (inaudible) served the second garnishment. At 
19 J that time the bank exercised that remedy and they did set it 
20 j off, they drew it out the account and applied all the funds 
21 they could which was about $17,000 towards the loan and 
22 that's shown in our supplemental exhibit. Let's see which 
23 one it is. That is shown in Exhibit E of the supplemental 
24 exhibit. You can see there the loan amount is again at the 
25 top is $46,300 and then down at the bottom you can see a 
1 principle only payment on 11-17 for that amount, $17,000. 
2 | The bank did allow the debtors to do business but they 
3 monitored - it was some time after the first punch list that 
4 they began to monitor payments coming in and only allow 
5 certain ones to go out. 
6 THE COURT: How could you allow certain to go out 
7 if they have a garnishment that the court says comes before 
8 the amount they allow to go out? I mean, how do they allow 
9 it to go out legally? 
10 MR. JENSON: The first garnishment would have 
11 expired after 120 days. That's under the rule. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. JENSON: So after that time the bank, the bank 
14 was (inaudible) total of three loans, couple hundred thousand 
15 dollars together. They didn't want to kill the business, 
16 they wanted it to keep going. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, okay -
18 MR. JENSON: So they -
19 THE COURT: I understand what they did. Legally 
20 how can they do that? That's my question because I read the 
21 cases, I read everything and there's nothing in the law that 
22 I can fxnd that allows them to do that once they receive the 
23 I garnishment. I agree with you that if they have a remedy for 
24 offset, they have monies that they want to claim for 
25 themselves and for their own debts, they can do that and I 
1 I don't have any quarrel with that because I think the law 
2 allows that, garnishment and all secured interest. 
3 My question is, how can they be the arbitrator to 
4 decide yes, we want - because when you write a check or a 
5 write a debit card, I mean, you're indebted to somebody but 
6 the people that are indebted to on those accounts don't have 
7 preference in charge of either the bank or Colonial. They're 
8 not in position in front of them for these funds and yet the 
9 bank by what it's doing is putting them in that position. 
10 That's what I don't understand because they're moving 
11 somebody up by what they do, ahead of the - and you're on 
12 I notice not to do that. I mean, it's net like the bank 
13 doesn't know because this is the second one. I just wonder 
14 under the law how they can do that? 
15 MR. JENSON: Okay. With the second garnishment I 
16 understand that when the bank responded to the second 
17 garnishment, in it's answers, I think it's line 3 in the 
18 garnishment it says, the bank is suppose to declare its 
19 reason for setting off any funds and the bank omitted that 
20 and (inaudible) order to show cause issued. The bank then 
21 showed that it did have a valid security interest in the 
22 (inaudible) and whatnot then all the funds then would be 
23 under control of the bank; is that not correct? 
24 THE COURT: If the bank takes them for themselves. 
25 MR. JENSON: Isn't that what the bank did though? 
1 I THE COURT: No, it didn't. It allowed them -
2 that's exactly what I'm saying. They allowed all these 
3 checks to be paid to other parties. They allowed to a 
4 VISA/Mastercharge to pay off debts of other parties. They 
5 allowed this debit card to go to pay off other parties. I 
6 understand the bank's argument and I understand the security 
7 agreement but I've dealt with this and that means the bank 
8 has the right to take it off their debts, to offset their 
9 loans, to offset their payments but they didn't do that. 
10 That's the difficulty that I have. That's not what they did. 
11 They allowed it to be paid to other parties other than 
12 themselves and other than Colonial because they decided that 
13 could do this in this defacto receivership and that's what 
14 I'm saying, that's where I really have problems with the law 
15 because there's nothing in the law that I'm aware of that 
16 I allows them to do that. 
17 I MR. JENSON: If the bank, however, is controlling 
18 what is paid out and why only so that the business can 
19 continue to pay, that goes to the bank. 
20 THE COURT: What legal authority does it have to do 
21 that? 
22 MR. JENSON: Well, it's allowed to do that under 
23 I its security agreement. 
24 THE COURT: No, there is no place in the security 
25 agreement that it says it can have a defacto receivership. 
1 I What it does is it says it can seize the account and it lists 
2 j the items that it can seize and take control of those items 
3 and have them pay their debts but it can't substitute itself 
4 for the court or substitute itself for somebody else and say, 
5 "You know what, I'm going to pay your claim but I'm not going 
6 to allow your claim. I'm going to move your claim ahead of 
7 this claim because I think that's in my interest to move your 
8 claim ahead of my claim." I mean, they're taking on a role 
9 I here that I think is really unique under the law and I don't 
10 think it's allowed, that's what I'm trying to ask. I mean, I 
11 understand the agreement and I understand the ability to 
12 offset and I understand the ability for them to say, "You now 
13 I what, we don't think this is going to do that and we want to 
14 take all your receivables out to pay our debt because we 
15 don't you're going to be able to pay." I don't have any 
16 problem with that because that's what they agreed to and 
17 that's what the parties agreed to but that's not what they 
18 did, that's the part that I have the problem with because 
19 that's not what they did. 
20 MR. JENSON: Okay, I can see that. From my point 
21 | of view if the bank is controlling the funds it's controlling 
22 how they're spent in furtherance of its own interests. If 
23 the bank is entitled to all of those funds and if they 
24 j release funds so they can be paid more in the future, that to 
me seems to go right in the line of the bank's authority to 
7 
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1 keep all the funds and control it for themself and pay off 
2 debts. 
3 THE COURT: Then we go back to the question, how 
4 under the law, what section of the law, what section of the 
5 code, what part of the contract, what law in Utah, what 
6 allows them to do this, what banking regulation allows them 
7 to assume that role? What under the UCC, what position 
8 allows them to determine under the UCC that people that have 
9 security interests ahead of all these other people, that 
10 these other people get to be paid first? 
11 MR. JENSON: So that I'm clear then, what the Court 
12 would - speaking hypothetically - what the Court would have 
13 liked to have seen is on service of the second garnishment 
14 when the bank set off (inaudible) $17,000 and applied it to 
15 the loan, from then on all other funds that were received 
16 through the bank would go to — 
17 THE COURT: Yes, I mean, $42,000 came in. If they 
18 took $17,000 for their loan, that's fine but there was still 
19 enough money to pay the garnishment. 
20 MR. JENSON: If the bank had kept that remaining 
21 amount to itself (inaudible) paid out again. 
22 THE COURT: Then if their security interest was 
23 superior, yes, they would have been allowed to do that. I 
24 | don't have a problem but money came in, they were on notice 
25 of garnishment, they set off their amount, they protected 
8 
1 themselves, they took their $17,000 but there was $41,000 
2 that came in. There was enough money to pay - protect the 
3 bank and protect the other but unilaterally they decided not 
4 to do it. In fact, they moved all these other people so the 
5 checks could go out and pay them ahead of their own, ahead of 
6 the garnishment that came in that I believe under the law had 
7 a superior security interest. 
8 MR. JENSON: Okay, I can see that. The only 
9 difference I see here is that if the bank had those funds in 
10 its control and chose to release them so they could be paid 
11 more — 
12 THE COURT: No, they didn't have the choice once 
13 they received the garnishment. They either had to take them 
14 themselves or give them to somebody that had a higher 
15 security interest. If they didn't want to protect their own 
16 rights - and the people that allowed this to do it, that 
17 controlled this was the bank and now what are they going to 
18 do? Are they going to go to all these individuals and get 
19 that money back from them? No. I mean I know Cache Valley -
20 they're not going to go to all these people that checks were 
21 written and to VISA and everything else and say we want this 
22 money back. 
23 MR. JENSON: Okay, I can see that too if it's the 
24 position that all the funds that were received by the bank 
25 after the date of garnishment, unless the bank put those 
1 funds and directly applied it to their loan, setting it off 
2 from access. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. And that's why I asked you. I'm 
4 not trying to argue with you or anything, that's why I asked 
5 you, where in the law or in the contract or some place, 
6 allowed them to do this other? 
7 MR. JENSON: Well, let's look at the contract. 
8 THE COURT: And I have. I've read through it three 
9 or four times. And is what I seen is it allows them to 
10 certain offsets and it allows them to do things for their 
11 own, if they feel he's in default, however he's in default. 
12 And that's the thing that's unusual aioout this because they 
13 didn't take everything. They just took a portion of it and 
14 then kept allowing this other money to be paid out to other 
15 individuals instead of somebody that had, already had a 
16 judgment entered. 
17 MR. JENSON: Yeah, I see that. 
18 Another issue too that I've made opposing counsel 
19 aware of it as soon as I found out about it, and the bank is, 
20 the IRS also has, I mean, there are several people chasing 
21 after these debtors. 
22 THE COURT: Right. And the IRS may come back and 
23 tell the bank the same thing. I mean, if I was an attorney 
24 for the IRS they may come back and tell the bank the same 
25 thing, "Why did you allow this money to be paid out to 
10 
1 somebody else when there was a valid federal tax lien?" I 
2 mean, it appears that they could come back against the bank 
3 too. 
4 MR. JENSON: True. I see that as well. 
5 THE COURT: I mean, I'm not - banks have 
6 obligations. Garnishments and these kinds of things and 
7 liens are things that happen all the time. I mean, it's 
8 seems quite incredible to me that they don't understand the 
9 legal ramifications of this, and they create something that 
10 in the law, I mean, they even have to call it the defacto 
11 I receivership which means it's really not a legal one, it's 
12 just one we've created of our own doing. 
13 J MR. JENSON: Right. 
14 j THE COURT: I mean, that word alone tells me-
15 I MR. JENSON: Yeah, I mean, it wasn't the bank's -
16 the bank has a vested interest to see that the (inaudible), I 
17 think, (inaudible) to the bank has a vested interested too. 
18 The bank doesn't want to kill the business because they hope 
19 to be repaid by (inaudible), whatever, plus thousands dollars 
20 still owed. And so my understanding from the bank was that 
21 certain debts were allowed to be paid but only because that 
22 would allow business to continue to repay the bank. Like - I 
23 don't know the specific details for each -
24 THE COURT: But do you see the difficulty that that 
25 places with the Court because the bank then is substituting 
11 
1 itself as who is going to determine which debts or which 
2 security interest and everything should come first and that 
3 even if you've filed or you've perfected or if you have a 
4 judgment and the law, under the law, certain ones would have 
5 priority over the other ones, the bank by their action is 
6 just taking the law and sort of throwing it out window and 
7 saying because of this defacto receivership we can put others 
8 ahead of - I mean, if you can do that our whole system of 
9 secured credit and everything else and judgments and priority 
10 and all those kinds of things have very little meaning if a 
11 bank can just say, you know, we have the ability to decide on 
12 our own which ones are going to be paid and which ones are 
13 not, and if a garnishment comes in we have the ability to 
14 say, Myou know what, for our protection and for this 
15 company's protection, it's better off that they pay these 
16 debts than they pay the garnishment." 
17 MR, JENSON: And I understand that point of view. 
18 The bank's position is once those funds are deposited in the 
19 bank, once the bank receives them, they belong in the bank. 
20 THE COURT: But they didn't, they allowed them to be 
21 paid out. 
22 MR. JENSON: Well-
23 THE COURT: And they didn't allow them to be paid 
24 out on bank negotiable instruments. They were paid out on 
25 I the negotiable - as I understand it, the documents I 
12 
received, because the checks came in, the $7,497.96 were 
checks of the business. And that those checks were allowed to 
be cleared and honored because they were checks of the 
business. The bank didn't take it in and say, "Okay, we are 
receiver, we're taking this in and then we're going to screen 
these and then we're going to pay them out with our own 
checks." Or, "We're," you know, like to pay off a VISA or 
things like that. But that's not what they did. You read 
through there and it looks like numbered checks that are from 
the company. 
MR. JENSON: Well, that's an assumption. I don't 
know if those are cashier's checks from the bank or if they 
are from-
THE COURT: Well, they look like they're-
MR. JENSON: -(inaudible). 
THE COURT: They're a series of checks that have 
been historically paid by the - on the check register of this 
company. 
MR. NYKAMP: I would also add, Your Honor, that if 
you're looking at the check register, there's never a 
withdrawal of the $17,901 that they're claiming was credited 
as an interest to settle in these documents that are filed 
with the Court today. 
MR. JENSON: There is actually. 
MR. NYKAMP: There's account balances, but there's 
13 
1 no withdrawal of those funds on the statement that I can see. 
2 MR. JENSON: If you look at - if you look at Exhibit 
3 A, it's contained in the Affidavit of the Garnishee. Exhibit 
4 A. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Exhibit A to your attachments-
6 MR. JENSON: It's - it may be in the supplemental 
7 exhibits too, I (inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: Yeah, because I didn't see that $17,000. 
9 I saw a $13,000 auto transfer for debit and I saw-
10 MR. JENSON: Okay, if you go to the Affidavit of 
11 Garnishee that was filed back on the, it's on the 12th, I 
12 guess. On the Affidavit of Garnishee there's an Exhibit A. 
13 MR. NYKAMP: Okay, I don't where you are. 
14 I MR. JENSON: That's the (inaudible) when you talk 
15 about subsequent checks being paid out or whatever after the 
16 second garnishment was served? 
17 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
18 MR. JENSON: It shows it on there. You can see on 
19 the first page of Exhibit A, down at the bottom, it says, 
20 "Number, Amount and Date" and underneath those columns, it 
21 says the amount of $17,901.94 on 11-01, see that? 
22 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
23 MR. JENSON: That's where they zeroed out the 
24 account balances and took all of those funds. And then in 
25 J the supplemental exhibit, Exhibit E of the supplemental 
14 
Exhibit, you can see where on 11-17 that full balance, the 
$17,901.94 was paid towards the loan balance. 
THE COURT: Well, how did they, how did all these 
checks clear then? 
MR. JENSONN: There were other deposits made after 
the first. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then why did they-
MR. JENSON: -(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Why didn't they honor the garnishment 
with those checks? 
MR. JENSON: Well, the bank was at that time 
controlling all of the funds coming into the bank. 
THE COURT: But why did they let the money go out? 
MR. JENSON: Again, like I said, it was the bank's 
position that it was their money. They were offsetting, they 
had offset the loan with all those other funds, the $17,000 
and then after that time they only allowed certain debts to 
be paid to allow the business to continue to repay the loans. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. NYKAMP: It seems odd, Your Honor, because 
there's not a deduction. Granted, it looks like an account 
balance and then 16 days later it shows up in the newest 
documents the bank has filed to date. It looks suspicious to 
me. 
MR. JENSON: Well, that, again, I mean, counsel is 
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accusing the bank there, I don't know what, of fraud? 
MR. NYKAMP: No, I'm just saying that it doesn't 
appear-
THE COURT: -you know, I don't think, I don't it's 
fraud or anything else. I think the bank is assuming a legal 
position that they don't have the right to assume. 
MR. JENSON: And I can see that and that may be, 
Your Honor. And that wasn't something that I anticipated as 
an issue here. The issue I saw was whether or not the bank 
had a secured right to these funds and had the right to 
control and retain them. 
Now, the bank - what happened on 11-01 when the 
bank zeroed out the accounts, that money was taken as a 
cashier's check and then it was reapplied. I don't know the 
reason for the delay as to why it was applied two weeks 
later, but the funds were withdrawn and held as a cashier's 
check. I've seen a copy of that cashier's check and that was 
just applied to this loan on the 17th. 
THE COURT: So the only protection they wanted for 
themselves was to pay off this loan, or $17,000? 
MR. NYKAMP: Even so, Your Honor, it still doesn't 
give them the right to allow the third party defendant to 
operate (inaudible) in lieu of the-
MR. JENSON: Well-
MR. NYKAMP: - order of the court. 
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MR. JENSON: And with all due respect, it wasn't the 
third party defendant that was controlling the account. The 
funds were deposited into the account but the bank was 
controlling how they were spent. 
THE COURT: But it doesn't appear that because 
they're allowing checks to clear. 
MR. JENSONN: Well, that's-
THE COURT: -written on the - by the business, by 
the Construction Associates. 
MR. JENSON: Well, that's what the Affidavit of the 
Garnishee states is the bank was controlling all (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Under this "defacto receivership". 
MR. JENSON: Right, right. 
THE COURT: But all the defacto receivership was is 
they were allowing them to write checks and be paid instead 
of paying the garnishee. 
MR. JENSON: Again, I don't - I don't know, I 
haven't seen copies of those checks. I don't know that they 
were checks written by the, written by-
THE COURT: Well, I mean-
MR. JENSON: Construction Associates. My 
understanding was is the bank was controlling who was paid 
and how and that's consistent with the affidavit of the 
garnishee. 
THE COURT: And then we go back to where we started. 
17 
1 MR. JENSON: Right -
2 THE COURT: How in the law can they do that? 
3 MR. JENSON: Well, if the bank has a right to 
4 control those funds, if the bank were to, say, go through a 
5 straw man and say, "okay, we've received this month - or in 
6 this two-week period we've received $20,000 in deposits and 
7 we can take this now and we can say, "we're done doing 
8 business with you, you still owe us a $120,000 on your loan" 
9 or we can take this money and we can control it and say, "We 
10 will pay this supplier so that they will allow you to use the 
11 rest of the supplies to finish this job so that we can pay 
12 more. If that's what's going on, I don't think there's a 
13 problem with that. The bank is controlling those funds. 
14 THE COURT: Oh, I see a big problem with that. 
15 MR. JENSON: If the third party, if the debtor, 
16 Construction Associates, KRT Drywall is the one who's just 
17 freely writing checks and the bank is paying them after 
18 receiving deposits-
19 THE COURT: And they are. 
20 MR. JENSON: -I think that's different. 
21 THE COURT: They are. 
22 MR. JENSON: But we don't have anything to show 
23 that, there isn't any evidence to show (inaudible) assumption 
24 that (inaudible). 
25 THE COURT: Well, okay, the evidence then - the 
1 inference or the evidence there would indicate that because 
2 it shows the checks were written and paid. It shows the 
3 number of the check. It shows the amount of the check and it 
4 shows the date of the check. And the account balances go 
5 down in, I mean, I look at my own account, this is the way my 
6 own account operates-
7 MR. JENSON: Sure. 
8 THE COURT: - they send a check with its number, its 
9 date and then the balance and then it goes down based on the 
10 amount. I mean, I don't know what inference, other inference 
11 I could possibly draw from this. 
12 MR. JENSON: Well, if it's, if you're the one that's 
13 controlling when its checks are written out and it's your 
14 account then that's a little different venue instead of the 
15 bank telling you (inaudible)-
16 THE COURT: Well, there's no, there's absolutely no 
17 indication that that's what happened. I mean none. And 
18 that's just-
19 MR. JENSON: I can, I can go back to the bank and -
20 THE COURT: No, we're - we have done this. We have 
2 1 - 1 think we have exercised enough time on this. I mean we 
22 really have. 
23 MR. JENSON: Well, I don't think that the facts here 
24 show that. I mean, we're basing this on the assumption that 
25 those checks, that the check numbers there-
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1 THE COURT: I have given Cache Bank now three 
2 hearings to produce the evidence to show what they did, that 
3 they're (inaudible). This is the third hearing, special 
4 hearing that I have allowed Cache Bank. I mean, I'm not -
5 and the affidavit of the person is we created a defacto 
6 receivership, and so we control how or where this money was 
7 spent and we allowed money to be sent to these third parties 
8 in front of a valid garnishment for a valid judgment. I 
9 mean, there's no question that that's - whether they did it 
10 themselves or they allowed the checks to go through, they 
11 made a determination that instead of taking the money for 
12 themselves, they wanted the money to go to other parties to 
13 pay their debts and move these other parties' debts in front 
14 of a valid judgment with a garnishment filed. They decided, 
15 we can do that. And I don't think in the law they can do 
16 that. There is no where in the law I think they can do that 
17 because that's not an offset. They're not offsetting. 
18 They're allowing somebody else to get the money instead of 
19 themselves. 
20 MR. JENSON: Well, so, let's look at the facts, 
21 I well, let's look at it as a hypothetical now. 
22 THE COURT: It's not a hypothetical, this is what 
23 really happened. 
24 MR. JENSON: If the bank received funds from 
25 deposits and then retained those, moved those funds to a 
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separate, you know, to the bank's own account or whatever-
THE COURT: I'm not going to deal with hypothetical. 
We're dealing with what they did. I mean that-
MR. JENSON: All right. If the banks, if this bank 
account though was wholly controlled by the bank as far as 
what was paid out and when, if all the funds in the bank 
account were the property of the bank. 
THE COURT: Well, I mean, that's even a question, 
you know, what about that they had too, but they didn't. I 
mean, they didn't. 
You know, in this, on the Order to Show Cause, are 
they in contempt of the garnishment? 
MR. JENSON: I would say no. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. JENSON: There was an omission because the bank 
employee who filled out the answers neglected to state the 
reason why those funds were retained. The bank did offset at 
the time the $17,000 was applied-
THE COURT: -but how about all the money that came 
in? They didn't offset that. 
MR. JENSON: Well, if you would require the bank to 
go through some sort of extra process to take all funds that 
were received from that account and to place them into the 
bank's own separate account and then from that account to 
issue separate checks to different creditors so that business 
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1 would continue. 
2 THE COURT: I'm not talking about hypotheticals. 
3 I'm talking about what they did. 
4 MR. JENSON: Well, if in action that's what they 
5 were doing, whether or not they took it out of that account. 
6 THE COURT: No, no. Come on, this is getting a 
7 little bit tiresome, honestly. I mean it is. 
8 MR. JENSON: If you feel that, Your Honor, if you 
9 feel that based on the evidence before you there is enough 
10 there to say definitively that what the bank did was allow 
11 the debtor to continue to pay these other creditors ahead of 
12 the judgment creditor here, I can see the problem with that. 
13 But if the bank was controlling those funds and only allowing 
14 in its own best interest certain other creditors to be paid 
15 I so that the bank could continued to be paid, I don't see the 
16 problem with that. 
17 THE COURT: -well, okay, okay. But the evidence-
18 MR. JENSON: (Inaudible). 
19 THE COURT: I'm going to make the following findings 
20 based on the evidence. It appears that the date of the 
21 garnishment was November 1, 2006. Following that the bank 
22 failed to provide an offset as required by law, they didn't 
23 I set the offset as required by law. And so when we had the 
24 notice and the order to show cause they weren't in compliance 
25 with the garnishment statute as required within Rule 64, 
because they didn't provide notice within the required time. 
MR. JENSON: Other than appearing at the hearing and 
showing the (inaudible) statement? 
THE COURT: Yes, yes. Yeah, but they didn't provide 
that notice timely as required under the garnishment statute. 
Even though they had notice of garnishment and everything 
else, they didn't provide the notice that is required under 
the garnishment statute that there was an offset. 
In addition, they did take an offset it appears of 
$17,000. However, into that account after the garnishment 
was a total of $41,789.52. They didn't take any other 
further offsets for themselves. The evidence that I have 
before me would indicate that they allowed the judgment 
debtor to continue to write checks and allow those checks to 
clear the bank to pay third parties while that garnishment 
was still in place, and was a valid garnishment still in 
place, and that the funds that they allowed to go out was in 
excess of the garnishment that was owed. I mean, they took 
their own money and there was still sufficient funds to pay 
the garnishment ahead of these others. They have denoted 
this as a defacto receivership. There is nothing in Rule 64 
or in the Uniform Commercial Code or in any of the agreements 
that I can see that would allow them to create this defacto 
receivership that would allow them to do what they have done 
in this case to circumvent a valid judgment and a valid 
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1 garnishment, and therefore, what they did violated and was in 
2 contempt of the order of the Court. And as a result, they 
3 should be ordered to pay the amount of the garnishment. 
4 MR. JENSON: If the bank were able to show that all 
5 of the funds that were dispersed from the account-
6 THE COURT: Okay. And I've been through it. This 
7 is the third opportunity that I've given the bank to present 
8 evidence on its behalf. And I have - and I think I've really 
9 been very open and very - and we've had three separate 
10 hearings scheduled to come in and say, "Bank, present what 
11 evidence to show me that you have - that what you did 
12 complied with the law and its valid." And I've received the 
13 evidence and that the evidence that I've received would be 
14 consistent with the findings that I have made. And so, at 
15 this point, you know, I've entered the order and I guess if 
16 I they want to appeal the order I've entered they can. 
17 I'm going to ask to prepare findings and an order 
18 consistent with my findings. And if they believe the 
19 evidence shows or establishes something different then - but 
20 under the law, I don't see any other result. I'm not trying 
21 to be arbitrary, I'm not trying to be anything. 
22 MR. JENSON: No. 
23 THE COURT: I'm just - because they're doing 
24 something that I don't see anywhere in the law, and I've 
25 J tried to research it, honestly, you know, is there such a 
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thing. I can't find such a legal animal that allows you to 
do things without at least going to the court. I mean 
receiverships and everything else have to go to the court and 
get the authority of the court to be a receiver. Whether its 
in probate or its in UCC or bankruptcy, I mean, all these 
things, this "defacto receivership" is something that's just 
- it's not in the law. 
MR. JENSON: Well, I don't think that it is. It's 
just an attempt to explain the relationship there. 
THE COURT: And I understand what they attempted to 
do. The question is could they legally do it? And I don't 
think they can. That's the issue. I mean, it's a pretty 
straightforward issue before the Court. 
MR. JENSON: With all due respect, I mean, that 
specific issue as to whether or not, whether or not that is 
what the bank was doing, that wasn't an issue that was 
presented before the Court at our last hearing. 
THE COURT: I think if you go back to the tape, the 
last tape, you asked me what I wanted and I said - I think if 
you go back last tape you'll find this - I said, "I would 
like to know if after the date of the garnishment came in, 
did the bank allow checks to be written and sent out, did 
they allow the person to keep doing business and allow checks 
to be sent out and bills to be paid and everything else?" 
I said, I would really like to know, that's why I'd 
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1 like to know the account statements because I want to know 
2 J what the bank allowed this person to do. If they allowed 
3 them to carry on business afterwards. And I said I think, 
4 you know, because if they did that, I don't know how that, 
5 and then this is what came back. 
6 MR. JENSON: Okay. 
7 THE COURT: And so I think if you look at that tape-
8 MR. JENSON: -it's clear -
9 THE COURT: I did address that. 
10 MR. JENSON: (Inaudible), Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: And so that's what I was looking for 
12 when we came back here. And I understand the position. You 
13 can't - you have to argue the position the best you can. You 
14 can't undo or do what the bank has done. I mean, they've 
15 done what they've done and because they've done what they've 
16 done, there are certain legal consequences. 
17 MR. JENSON: I'm sure that's clear as well. 
18 THE COURT: And that's all I'm trying to deal with 
19 and trying to be. My role as a judge is to fairly look at 
20 the law and say how do we interpret the law. And I don't 
21 know how to interpret it any differently than this given the 
22 - this scenario where we have very exacting laws and 
23 especially with a bank who, I mean, garnishments, you deal 
24 with those every day in a bank. 
25 I MR. JENSON: This garnishment's unique in that, the 
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offset, I mean, they're-
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JENSON: The bank receives lots and lots of 
garnishments to just garnish people's bank accounts for 
various debts, but where the bank has a secured property 
interest here, it's a little different than just an every day 
garnishment. 
THE COURT: I understand that. 
Is there anything else to come before the Court? 
MR. NYKAMP: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. NYKAMP: So, Your Honor, just so I understand, 
would you propose that I draft a Findings and Fact and a 
Judgment on the garnishment amount? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. NYKAMP: Would the Court be willing to grant 
interest and attorney's fees and costs? 
THE COURT: Well, I've granted attorney's fees twice 
now. 
MR. NYKAMP: For today's hearings, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Given what has happened, yes, for 
today's hearings also. And you'll prepare that order? 
MR. NYKAMP: I'll prepare it. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
MR. NYKAMP: Thank you. 
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1 MR. JENSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. 
3 [ (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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